Donald Trump is set to begin his second term on January 20, 2025, and with the Senate expected to confirm his key Cabinet and advisory appointments this month, his administration is shaping up to bring renewed focus to U.S.-China relations. Trump’s “America First” approach has already left its mark on this complex relationship, and his new team seems prepared to carry that vision forward — though with a likely tougher stance on some fronts.
Why these choices? Part of it reflects Trump’s commitment to putting American priorities first. At the same time, each of these appointees — Howard Lutnick, Marco Rubio, Pete Hegseth, and Mike Waltz — has a track record of being critical of Beijing’s policies. Together, they bring a focused and assertive perspective on China, which could shape the next chapter of U.S.-China relations in significant ways.
This analysis takes a closer look at their public statements, past actions, and viewpoints to explore how these key figures might influence U.S. policy toward China. By understanding their approaches and priorities, we can begin to piece together what Trump’s second term might mean for the future of this pivotal relationship.
Howard Lutnick as Commerce Secretary
Howard Lutnick, the long-standing Chairman and CEO of Cantor Fitzgerald, is widely recognized for his leadership in finance rather than politics. His influence stems not only from overseeing a global financial services firm but also from his personal experience in guiding the company through its substantial losses following the September 11 attacks. Over time, Lutnick’s business dealings, including operations in Asian markets, have shaped his critical stance on China’s economic practices. These firsthand experiences — coupled with a shared “America First” viewpoint that resonates with Donald Trump’s political brand — offer insight into why Lutnick would be chosen to lead the Commerce Department in a second Trump administration.
Although Lutnick is not a career politician, he has voiced strong opinions about what he considers to be China’s “unfair” economic practices. In a 2020 CNBC interview, for instance, he criticized China’s reliance on currency manipulation and government subsidies, maintaining that the United States “needs a robust enforcement mechanism to level the playing field.” Similarly, in a 2021 Forbes feature, he expressed concern over “massive technology outflow” to adversarial nations — particularly China — and proposed tighter controls over strategic sectors such as semiconductors and artificial intelligence. These views suggest that, as Commerce Secretary, Lutnick would likely prioritize cracking down on intellectual property theft and tightening export restrictions on sensitive technologies.
Given his background in high finance, Lutnick is also no stranger to concerns about Chinese investments in the United States. He has advocated increasing the scope of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to ensure careful reviews of foreign acquisitions, particularly in areas like critical infrastructure, biotech, and advanced manufacturing. This approach aligns with a broader push within the U.S. government to scrutinize China’s access to strategic industries and to curb forced technology transfers that often occur in joint ventures or research collaborations. Marco Rubio as Secretary of State
Marco Rubio has never been shy about his stance on China. As a Senator from Florida, he’s been among the most vocal critics of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), routinely calling out what he sees as Beijing’s disregard for human freedoms and democratic norms. If he steps into the role of Secretary of State under a second Trump term, he’ll likely bring that same intensity to American diplomacy — though his work could be complicated by the fact that China has sanctioned him not once, but twice.
Rubio’s track record really speaks volumes. He co-authored the “Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act,” emphasizing that “China’s erosion of Hong Kong’s autonomy not only breaches international agreements but also threatens democratic values worldwide.” In 2020, he called the situation in Xinjiang — where Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities face alleged repression — “one of the worst human rights atrocities of our time.” When it comes to Taiwan, Rubio’s tweets read like an unwavering endorsement of its democratic system, insisting that “We must stand with our democratic allies, including Taiwan, against authoritarian expansion.”
Those strong criticisms didn’t go unnoticed in Beijing. As a direct response to his outspoken views, the Chinese government has slapped Rubio with sanctions — twice. On a practical level, this could make it tougher for him to engage in direct diplomacy or visit China in any capacity, assuming Beijing would even allow him entry. It also signals that Chinese officials may be less willing to negotiate on major issues if they view Rubio as a hostile figure. That presents a real challenge for someone tasked with managing a delicate and increasingly competitive relationship between two global powers.
Still, Rubio’s vision for a “coalition of democracies” in the Indo-Pacific remains clear. He’s likely to push for stronger ties with nations that share U.S. values, such as Japan, Australia, and India, even if it means escalating tensions with Beijing. We’d probably see more vocal criticism of China’s human rights record, paired with targeted sanctions on Chinese officials or entities deemed complicit in abuses. And he hasn’t been shy about suggesting reforms — if not outright withdrawal — from global organizations like the WHO or the UN if they don’t clamp down on what he views as Beijing’s outsized influence.
Pete Hegseth as Defense Secretary
Pete Hegseth is a name you might recognize from his time in the military or from his appearances commenting on national security in the media. He’s never been one to mince words about the threat he believes China poses to U.S. interests — and he’s just as upfront about what he thinks Washington should do in response. If he steps into the role of Defense Secretary, expect a hardline stance centered on bolstering military readiness, reinforcing alliances in Asia, and maintaining a decisive technological edge over Beijing.
His track record leaves little doubt. In 2019, Hegseth famously told Fox News that “China’s overt military expansion in the South China Sea and beyond calls for unwavering American resolve — our allies in the region need a strong partner.” For him, that means a bigger defense budget to ensure the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) never closes the capability gap. Hegseth has also been clear about Taiwan, insisting that the U.S. should “never rule out” the possibility of using force to protect the island from potential Chinese aggression.
But it’s not just about straightforward defense spending. Hegseth has consistently pointed to flashpoints like the South China Sea, where Beijing continues to construct and militarize artificial islands, and the Taiwan Strait, which China views as non-negotiable territory. Add in China’s rumored or alleged supply of military or dual-use items to Russia during the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, and you’ve got a strategic landscape that Hegseth would consider deeply troubling. He’s likely to see any material support Beijing provides to Moscow as further evidence of a growing Sino-Russian alignment — one that demands a stronger U.S. military posture and closer coordination with allies in Europe as well as Asia.
If Hegseth does take the helm at the Pentagon, we can expect a beefed-up U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific. That might mean stepping up naval deployments, conducting more frequent freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, and pressing for increased joint exercises with regional partners like Japan, Australia, and India — moves that would send a loud signal to China. We’d likely see tougher rhetoric and possibly punitive measures if China continues backing Russia’s war effort, such as sanctions on Chinese firms that ship key components or technology to Moscow.
Another area where Hegseth could make waves is military innovation. He’s spoken repeatedly about the need to stay ahead in the arms race, especially in emerging fields like AI-driven warfare, hypersonic missiles, and cyber defense. In his view, allowing China to overtake the U.S. in these high-tech arenas is simply unthinkable. That perspective might translate into expanded defense tech programs, closer ties with U.S. tech giants, and heavier scrutiny of any American research that could be exploited by China.
Mike Waltz as National Security Advisor
Mike Waltz is no stranger to sounding the alarm on China. As a Congressman, he’s made it a personal mission to show how national security and economic policy are deeply intertwined — especially when it comes to Beijing. Whether he’s pushing legislation to secure U.S. supply chains or cautioning against China’s rapid strides in space, Waltz is convinced that Washington needs a “whole-of-government” approach to counter what he sees as growing Chinese influence.
His statements over the last few years make that crystal clear. In 2020, he insisted that “our supply chains, especially in critical technologies, must not be beholden to the CCP.” This view spurred him to co-sponsor bills aimed at reducing America’s dependence on Chinese manufacturing for things like medical supplies and rare-earth minerals — an idea that only gained traction when COVID-19 exposed how fragile global supply lines could be. Waltz has also been blunt about the importance of protecting American innovations, warning that “we must ensure American breakthroughs don’t end up powering China’s military ambitions.”
It doesn’t stop there. Waltz has repeatedly highlighted space as a new frontier for U.S.-China competition, noting that Beijing’s advancing space program could give it a strategic edge in everything from satellite communications to missile defense. He wants the U.S. to invest more heavily in both military and commercial space ventures — essentially drawing a line that says, “We’re not ceding this high ground to anyone.”
If Waltz takes the helm as National Security Advisor, expect him to knit together the efforts of Defense, Commerce, Treasury, and State in a united stance against China’s global ambitions. That could mean reinforcing export controls on sensitive technologies and slapping more sanctions on any Chinese companies seen as complicit in IP theft or human rights abuses. And if there are future trade talks with Beijing, Waltz might insist on framing them around security concerns — making sure any deal includes strict conditions on supply chains, investment rules, or market access.
Overall Policy Trajectory under a Second Trump Term
A second Trump administration would likely lean heavily on “China hawks,” yet past experience suggests that economic pragmatism might still shape the contours of U.S.-China policy. While appointments like Marco Rubio, Pete Hegseth, Mike Waltz, and Howard Lutnick point to a more confrontational posture, the presence of figures such as Elon Musk in the president’s broader circle could temper the hardline approach. Musk’s substantial business interests in both the U.S. and China — most notably via Tesla’s operations in Shanghai — position him as an informal but influential voice advocating selective engagement.
In practice, Trump has shown a willingness to pivot or offer concessions when economic stakes are high. This might manifest in targeted cooperation, especially if agricultural exports or new commercial ventures offer tangible benefits to key domestic constituencies. At the same time, the rhetoric — and likely the policies — would ratchet up tensions on issues of intellectual property, technology transfers, and security concerns. Musk could argue against total decoupling if he deems it harmful to U.S. tech innovation or detrimental to his global supply chains, thereby creating an internal tug-of-war between hawkish voices and those urging a measured approach to bilateral trade.
Beyond the economic sphere, this administration would probably intensify military and diplomatic efforts to contain China’s regional ambitions. Strengthening ties with the “Quad” nations — Australia, India, and Japan — while fostering relationships with ASEAN states wary of Beijing could become a central element of Trump’s strategy. Marco Rubio, in particular, would likely seek to align European and NATO allies against China, emphasizing human rights and technology standards as common points of concern. Still, if Musk and other business leaders press for ongoing dialogue, some form of selective engagement could remain on the table, provided Beijing shows willingness to meet specific U.S. demands.
Such an approach is not without risks. A stronger U.S. military presence in the Indo-Pacific — coupled with heightened pressure over flashpoints like the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait — could compel China to respond in kind, increasing the chances of maritime or aerial confrontations. China’s alleged role in supplying Russia with military or dual-use technology during the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war might also factor into policy decisions, prompting tighter export controls or new sanctions from Washington. These escalating measures could, in turn, jolt global supply chains, with repercussions for businesses dependent on cross-border trade and manufacturing.
Domestically, a more assertive stance on China tends to garner bipartisan support in Congress, at least in principle. However, a policy emphasizing military buildup or extensive sanctions could strain federal budgets and raise questions about the overextension of U.S. resources. Skeptics might also caution that an intense focus on confronting China could overshadow other pressing foreign policy concerns. Meanwhile, individuals like Musk could argue for bolstering America’s technological leadership through incentives at home — be it in renewable energy, autonomous vehicles, or space exploration — rather than relying primarily on punitive measures against Beijing.
In the end, any move toward a more aggressive stance on China will depend on how effectively different voices within the Trump administration balance economic opportunity with strategic caution. A second term is likely to see a continued push for greater leverage over Beijing, but whether the United States chooses uncompromising confrontation or a more nuanced mix of engagement and deterrence remains an open question — one heavily influenced by the interplay between hawkish Cabinet appointees and entrepreneurial influencers like Elon Musk.
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